I. INTRODUCTION
The Panama Papers revealed serious defects in Hong Kong's corporate governance. Particularly, the scandal showed the lapses in the way Hong Kong's government regulates and checks its financial firms and professional services providers.
1 While Hong Kong's government has failed to conduct (or at least publicly release) a study looking at the harms of the Panama Papers revelations, the European Union has.
2 At first, the study looks like any other ordinary impact assessment -looking at the tax law, corporate law, and the regulation of financial institutions. Look more deeply though, and one sees a study about EU administrative law. The study looks at the rules the EU and its Member States' ministries of finance should put in place to deal with the way they (these government bodies) should regulate, inspect and so forth. In other words, how EU member states' (and the EU's in general) administrative law should change. Administrative law represents an unloved branch of public law. Yet, as the Panama Papers revelations show, the way government ministries, agencies, and even independent bodies invested with public power, regulate and investigate (or not) strikes at the heart of administrative law. 3 The old days of administrative law as fixed, specific rules -given to civil servants and other public officials -are numbered.
In this paper, we argue that a new way of thinking about administrative law is needed to remedy the problems revealed by the Panama Papers. That new way (not very new for many governments) involves regulating what public entities do and the goals of their work, rather than the way they do it. Government increasingly has and takes responsibility for the conduct of all kinds of groups in society -including companies. Government's role in influencing corporate governance shows how and why we need to re-conceive of administrative law as a law of ends, rather than means. Such law can encourage groups to assess corporate governance (or not), encourage disclosure (or not), self-regulate (or not), and even nudge corporate and other types of law toward focusing on legitimate ends rather than regulating conduct. Any conception of administrative law as simply listing an agency's rights and obligations sorely misses the need for ambiguity and flexibility in public administration (two features antithetical to the classic predictability-and-clarity way of understanding administrative law). 4 Remedying the wrongs found in the Panama Papers will require rules far more results-focused and far less mechanical than most administrative law. Each section of this paper illustrates how a more flexible, resultsoriented view of administrative law (Hong Kong's in particular) can help to remove the poor corporate governance identified by/in the Panama Papers. The first section presents data covering the major issues and problems in Hong Kong identified in the Panama Papers. The second section shows how government rules can encourage the practical, useful and accurate measurement of corporate governance quality. The third section discusses administrative law's role in encouraging corporate disclosure. Such a role revolves far more around encouraging private actors to act (or not) than controlling or checking companies. The fourth section describes the way administrative law can channel the incentives of self-regulating bodies, like lawyers and accountants. The fifth section most concretely illustrates the issues arising in the previous sections -in the form of a principles-based test for legitimate economic purposes. Government has certain ends to incentivize -often developing administrative principles or tests to help guide civil servants as they channel private sector incentives. 5 Each of these sections describes a facet of such incentivisation. The final section concludes.
We ask for the readers' indulgence as we make our argument with the following limitations in mind. First and most importantly, we do not make the case for or against such an approach to administrative law. We only try to observe the world -and draw conclusions about the approach which would most reduce the problems identified by the Panama Papers. Our tone reflects the outcome of that consideration -rather than any attempt to sell the reader on any particular approach. Second, we do not provide a classical literature review, showing how our understanding of the form and needs of administrative law have changed over time. 6 We hardly need to provide such a review -given the wide-spread recognition of the failure of classical public administration and administrative law as branches of social science inquiry. See Instead, we grapple directly with this evolving view of administration law's role in the broader legal framework through the four major reform areas identified by the Panama Papers. We apologise beforehand to any readers uncomfortable with our engaging the literature as we talk about changes in Hong Kong's rules and regulations -giving almost a "literature review on the fly."
7 Third and relatedly, we do not survey every area of administrative law (or the public sector agencies in which such law holds reign). 8 We use the specific area of law affecting corporate governance in order to illustrate broader trends affecting all areas of the public administration. 9 We leave to the readers' good judgement and prior knowledge the extent to which our analysis covers changes to the broader administrative field. 10 Fourth, we write about prescriptive change in Hong Kong -describing the way law should effect normative rather than positive change. In other words, and parroting the literature we review, we talk certain reforms almost as a fait accompli. We do this to focus our paper on our main argument, dealing with the way our conception of administrative law must change, rather than weighing the pros and cons of each reform. (2012) . 7 The fruitless discussion of "global administrative law" illustrates the need to keep our discussion specific -without pontificating about general trends, while offering little in the way of concrete proof. See 297, 356 (2010) . 9 The literature commonly uses such an approach for tackling such a large and ambitious project. For just one example, in this case using environment-related administrative law to illustrate broader themes in administrative law, see Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 933, 962 (2013) . 10 For example, many US analysts see administrative law transforming as the result of judicial activism (basically power grabbing) -rather than as coping with an increasingly complex business/social environment. We do not try to present or evaluate these claims -which obviously partly explain Hong Kong's own regulatory paroxysms. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The "Reformation of Administrative Law" Revisited, 31 J. L. ECON. 782, 807 (2015) . 11 As Howson does, we forgo judging particular corporate governance reforms to look at their effect on law in general. A recent hacking scandal illustrates the problems with laws regulating private sector activity -and the role that off-shore entities play -in undermining such law. The massive online release of files related to the offshore incorporation services provider Mossack Fonseca illustrates some of the weaknesses in corporate governance regulation in the Asian region. 12 The 2015 revelations shows that Mossack Fonseca's affiliates in Hong Kong -like P&P Secretarial Management and its British Virgin Islands registered interest Harvest Sun Trading -helped set up thousands of shell companies. 13 At its apogee, the firm set up 2,428 companies in 2012.
14 Many of these offshore entities, namely a non-trading corporation (or entity with tradable/transferrable interests) that do not conduct significant operations related to the transformation of inputs into marketable outputs, may serve a valid economic/business purpose. Yet, many of them helped facilitate crime. 15 The Panama Papers scandal thus exposed a veritable network of offshore financial centres helping facilitate corporate fraud, corruption, and corporate misgovernance. Hong Kong belongs to this network of offshore financial centres -some of whom sometimes help launder ill-gotten gains. Table 1 shows the jurisdiction of incorporation and number of companies listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (hereinafter referred to as "HKEx"). The British Virgin Islands (hereinafter referred to as "BVI") plays a key role in Hong Kong's foreign investment and incorporation business. Hong Kong could plausibly attract productive companies from the US, UK, Singapore, and the Mainland to list on its stock market. But what productive enterprise needs investment in the Cayman Islands, the BVI or Liberia? The Mossack Fonseca hack revealed Hong Kong's importance in the wider networks of offshore companies cycling money to each other. 17 Yet, given the wide-spread adoption of anti-money laundering and related regulations across the financial centres, combined with low taxes in many jurisdictions nowadays, one must ask what benefits do Hong Kong companies get from incorporating elsewhere?
18 Given Hong Kong's regulatory similarity with the BVI and other offshore centres, why would companies need these other offshore centres' services at all? 19   TABLE 1 WHY DO WE ACCEPT SHELLS FROM BVI AND OTHER  INCORPORATION MILLS?   Bermuda  655  Marshall Islands  187  British Virgin Islands  1174  Panama  337  Cayman Islands  3894  Singapore  228  China  296  Taiwan  80  Japan  185  UK  282  Liberia  206  USA  499 The data in the Hong Kong's financial and company secretarial advisory institutions' participation in the offshore shenanigans elucidated by the Panama Papers shows why companies need these offshore centres.
20 Figure 1 shows the sheer number of Hong Kong financial institutions and related parties identified in Papers. 21 The Panama Papers data indicate that at least 12 offshore banks and 3 intermediaries in Hong Kong had dealings with Mossack Fonseca. These numbers may not appear large. But taking into account finance and securities companies as well, over 500 companies had a touch with Hong Kong. Both the Panama Papers, and numerous other studies, show how offshore companies can incentivise corporate managers and owners to engage in poor corporate governance practices. The recent World Bank study on shell companies, in particular, provides numerous examples of poor corporate governance practices facilitating the use of shell companies to siphon away money from these corporations themselves. 22 A Basel Committee on Banking Supervision communiqué signed by several officials, even from tax havens themselves (such as Jersey, Bermuda, Cayman, and Guernsey), urged the closing of shell banks and 20 Company secretary advisors consist of companies whose niche market focuses on providing corporations with advice on incorporation, filing corporate documents, accounting services, and even sometimes providing "nominee" directors and shareholders. For more information on these providers, and the corporate secretary more generally, see H.K. KONG INST. CHARTERED SECRETARIES (CSJ), THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPANY SECRETARY -IN HONG KONG'S LISTED COMPANIES 20-39 (2012), https://www.hkics.org.hk/media/publication/attachment/PUBLICATION_A_2336_Research%20Report %202012_Eng.pdf. 21 The leak of the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca's client data lead to revelations about the use of offshore companies. The wide-spread media attention paid to these data dubbed the circumstances leading to the use of Mossack Fonseca's services as the Panama Papers scandal. We refer to the Panama Papers data in this paper as data from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists' (ICIJ) Offshore Leaks Database. The database includes information from the Panama Papers, the Offshore Leaks and the Bahamas Leaks. Yet, we refer to Panama Papers only as a shorthand for these combined search results to make our paper easier to read. See Dale Fast, History of Biology and Medicine, SAINT XAVIER U., https://faculty.sxu.edu/~fast/general_biology/hisory.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2001). 22 See WORLD BANK, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL STRUCTURES TO HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (World Bank Publications Press 2011). For example, Anglo-Leasing (Kenya) won a lucrative government tender to supply passport services at a cost five times higher than the lowest bidder. This UK mailbox-registered company subcontracted to the French firm who actually put in the lowest bid to do the work. In another case, investigators found that DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO sent improper payments to 25 bank accounts scattered around the world in order to engage in, and hide, bribe payments. Without these avenues to launder money, these firms' corporate governance might have been better. offshore booking centres as early as 2003. 23 These data (illustrated in Figure 1 ) and public statements illustrate the broader conclusion reached by academics themselves -that these offshore companies tend to undermine the quality of corporate governance. The lack of corporate governance-related disputes brought to court means that Hong Kong jurisprudence cannot develop the same kind of legal innovations and doctrines which have arisen in the US and UK. Figure 2 shows the number of cases appearing in Hong Kong's courts due to poor corporate governance, fraud or disputes over mergers and so forth. Shareholder fraud represents the largest reason for litigation in Hong Kong's courts among the four factors we searched for -shareholder fraud, disputes over mergers, backdoor listings, and/or corporate governance-related disputes. 24 Such disputes have increased very slightly, in absolute terms, over the course of the last decade. The lack of such cases means that, unlike in the US, these cases have created no law -administrative or otherwise -as a way of remedying corporate governance and other problems. If legal doctrines and concepts like "derivative actions", 23 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Shell Banks and Booking Offices, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENT (Jan. 2003), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs95.pdf. 24 For the last factor, we simply searched on the key word "corporate governance" -thus we do not try to dig too deeply into exactly what the experts categorize under that rubrique. "proper purpose" and "corporate opportunity" emerged from the crucible of litigation, then not enough cases have gone into Hong Kong's crucible (courts) to dent the law. The extent to which professional service providers aided in setting up the offshores which facilitated poor corporate governance shows the need for a broader policy response -and thus the action of public officials and civil servants guided by administrative laws. Figure 3 shows the percent of professional services firms accepting an approach to provide shell company incorporation services to an individual posing as a client engaged in illegal/unethical conduct. shows, Hong Kong's law firms lodge only a small fraction of suspicious transaction reports submitted by financial services firmssomething every service provider must do under law. 27 Reducing the use of offshores to facilitate corruption -or at the very least selfserving corporate behaviour by managers and owners -will undoubtedly require more government inspections, oversight and rules imposed on professional service firms. 28 Clearly, the administrative law governing the way financial regulators, professional services regulators, and risk-analysts in numerous government departments dealing with money laundering, selfserving by corporate insiders, and other corporate governance failures needs such revision.
FIGURE 3 HONG KONG'S DODGY PROFESSIONAL SERVICE PARTNERS ABOARD
The figure shows the percent of professional service providers willing to set up a shell company for academics posing as terrorists or persons with questionable motives. We have subtracted the original data from 100 (as the original data showed the percent refusing to provide services These data from the Panama Papers show why Hong Kong needs a new and different conception of administrative law -at least in financial and corporate affairs, if not more generally. Regardless of whether Hong Kong's civil servants and businesses follow existing rules, Hong Kong financial institutions' and intermediaries' desire to create and use questionable offshore corporations clearly represents a public policy issue. As we show in the following sections, disincentivizing activities which contribute to poor corporate governance requires administrative rulemaking which focuses on results -and provides civil servants with broader doctrines and tests, rather than specific rules of behaviour. 30 In other words, such an administrative law should be "non-administrative", namely far less bureaucratic, specific and rules-based. 31 Many of the principles 30 The literature has come to a consensus that principles-based administrative rulemaking is not an all-of-nothing proposition. Yet, finding the right balance between broader results-oriented rules, and specific rules of action for regulators and others, represents the key task. 33 Calling the new system Transnational New Governance, these authors argue that the onus of regulation and enforcement has moved from government agencies to the wider business sector and civil society. Yet, as corporate governance survey work shows, academics and others conduct these assessments on an ad hoc basis -jeopardizing their comprehensiveness and repeatability. 34 Political concerns and the formality attached to official corporate governance peer reviewslike those championed by the Financial Stability Board -distort the data too much to use in academic or policy settings. 35 The Financial Stability Board has no apparent mechanism or funding source in place to ensure regular objective evaluation (ie. not simply asking government officials what they think about their jurisdiction's corporate governance rules). The review by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter referred to as "OECD") on corporate governance around the world ostensibly represents an excellent starting point for evaluating corporate governance rules in Hong Kong. 36 Yet, these evaluations fail to gather information about the implementation and effects of these corporate governance rules. Many even criticize that assessments based on codes of corporate governance were developed directly or indirectly (through their work on OECD, CSLA and other assessors') by the companies being assessed themselves.
37
The most obvious way to rectify such a lack of objective measurement consists of encouraging a government or quasigovernment body to conduct such measurement -and this invokes the need for administrative law-making. The simplest approach to such law-making might consist of "crowding in" such assessment from a credible third-party -like the OECD's Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members. The OECD has increasingly worked with regional institutions like the Asian Development Bank on corporate governance-related dialogue and meetings for the better part of a decade.
38 Unlike peer review done by the Financial Stability Board, and the OECD itself, such cooperation usually involves sending socalled experts to China and elsewhere, to make observations and ratings. Such cooperative arrangements though represent a bugbear for administrative law -in effect outsourcing activities to foreign entities. 39 These experts often cannot escape the politicisation of the institutions they do these studies for -in effect making them not- 36 Isaksson et al. provides a broad overview of corporate governance regulations, while the OECD deals in-depth with the specific topics of related party transactions, takeover bids and shareholder meetings. See Mats Isaksson, Winfrid Blaschke, Hé ctor Lehuedé andAkira Nozaki , SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9-31 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/su pervision-and-enforcement-in-corporate-governance_9789264203334-en#page4. See also OECD, OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTBOOK (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/CorporateGovernance-Factbook.pdf. 37 We talk about the potential influence on CSLA (one of the funders of the Asian Corporate Governance Association's assessments) later. For a discussion of such influence and the way assessing these codes bypasses the main issues, very-expert. 40 While expedient in the short-term, such contractingout can impair a government's own long-term efforts at monitoring. 41 More damningly, these principles may not even apply -in part or at all -to China (where more than 50% of Hong Kong's listed companies hail from).
42
The establishment of a local entity with over-sight competencies for these assessments, but without the actual obligation to carry them out, might bring the best hope for developing administrative law in this area. The Financial Services Development Council represents a quasi-government group tasked with, among other things, doing these kinds of surveys. 43 Such evaluation would help develop Hong Kong's administrative law by requiring the development and assessment of rules for the Council to conduct these surveys. The US's recent review of their survey regulations provides both government officials and outsiders with knowledge about those procedures (increasing transparency) and the ability to change/improve them (improving performance). 44 Such regulation serves an instrumental purpose in the US Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission's work. 45 Such work may seem simply mechanical or instrumental. Yet, as a Norwegian law review recently noted, even simple procedures for collecting data may comprise an "algorithm" (albeit a very simple one) which increasingly guides 40 government activity and behaviour. 46 These algorithms seek particular outcomes -so why regulate the means rather than the ends of their action?
To what extent would administrative law direct an informal body like the Financial Services Development Council and its possible survey work? The Financial Services Development Council itself represents a body which many would not consider a government agency capable of promulgating citable administrative law. 47 The Council has members who may adopt administrative law in their own government departments. The government relies heavily on work by similar councils (often due to political reasons). 48 Because their decisions and resources never seem controversial enough to be challenged in court, we do not have an official ruling about the extent of their legality (namely whether they can provide public services, take over work done by others, etc.). 49 While increasing interest has emerged in reforming these councils and quasigovernmental bodies, academics still cannot agree on whether governments had ever vested legal authority into them (except perhaps as contractors in providing services that businesses could also provide). 50 Clearly, the law regulating the Council's work must -and does -regulate the ends of its work, rather than the way members and attached civil servants to the Council conduct that work. 51 Indeed, call its organic regulation a "Terms of Reference" speaks volumes about the regulatory intent to focus on ends rather than means. The Council's governance lies, not in a formal contract per se, but clearly an implicit contract allows the Council to work on public activities as long as certain What about leaving these assessments up to the market (and thus completely unregulated)? The most important tool at present for assessing corporate governance in Hong Kong (and possibly the whole Asian region) consists of the Asian Corporate Governance Association's (hereinafter referred to as "ACGA") and CSLA's Corporate Governance Review.
52 Table 2 shows a sample of its latest rankings -from 2015. 53 The organisation has published these assessments since 2003 -providing potentially comparative data for over 13 years.
54 Such a track records beats hands-down other institutions, like the Asian Development Bank, which conducts oneoff ad hoc assessments according to their popularity and funding. 55 Even the IMF has not been able to assess China's corporate governance. 56 At first glance, having the non-governmental sector do these assessments -according to their own rules and whimslooks like the way to go. Independence from government -and thus administrative lawrepresents both a vice and virtue. The assessment organisation's need to attract clients represents a clear vice. The CSLA, an investment advisor, represents one of the Association's large funders. Judging by the ACGA's 2012 report, most of the assessment seems to revolve around general market trends, with one or two companies' cases described as examples.
57 Discussion of the 14 or so companies the report focused on contained 2-3 sentences, with information seemingly taken from the news. 58 A quick overview of the report suggests that the sponsoring organisations do not practice favouritism vis-à -vis powerful companies. 59 Yet, the incentives will always remain to provide assessments and consulting at the same time and to the same companies. Simply putting administrative law constraints on the ACGA's ratings work, if the Association receives government money, would only alter the degree (not the impact) of restrictions placed on the entity. 60 Sponsorship from a market regulator or market maker could significantly dull CSLA and ACGA's incentives to talk-up potential clients -even if potentially burnishing its credibility.
61
What about regulating such assessment through a regulated body? Could legislation or regulation change the HKEx Listing Rules to encourage, or even require, participation in -and aid with -such assessments? 62 Other institutions do not have the funding, interest in promoting market quality and institutional support that HKEx has. 63 The HKEx earned HK$8 billion in 2015. 64 As its official website shows, the HKEx also advertises at length its corporate social responsibility. If the HKEx supports the ACGA $1 million 57 61 Study after study shows that attachment to government (and thus its administrative law) brings a certain amount of public trust and confidence -due to the possibility of democratic control. Gash and Rutter interestingly try to find the principles underlying the optimal level of such independent funding. See Tom Gash & Jill Rutter, The Quango Conundrum, 82 THE POL'Y. Q. 95 (2011) (U.K.). 62 See HKEx, Main Board Listing Rules (2019), https://en-rules.hkex.com.hk/sites/default/files/net_ file_store/new_rulebooks/c/o/consol_mb.pdf. 63 The Financial Services Development Council, research institutions at the local universities, and even the Company Register represent less desirable alternatives. In the case of the first two, they have no sustainable revenue source. In the latter, the conflict of interest obviously exists between register and assessor. 64 See HKEX, HKEX 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 37-61 (2016), https://www.hkexgroup.com/-/media/H KEX-Group-Site/ssd/Investor-Relations/Regulatory-Reports/documents/2016/160321ar_e.pdf.
(roughly US$128,000) annually, such money should be enough to pay for the social goods aspects of its work. HKEx has "community" as a core value, as "help[ing] to build a sustainable community by supporting local initiatives that create effective and lasting benefits to the community." 65 The HKEx should not have the right to influence assessments -even if these assessments might influence itself and its members. 66 Indeed, having an Ordinance on the limits and authorisations allowable under/for such assessments -like the US has -would go a long way toward developing Hong Kong's own administrative law in this area. 67 Unlike in other cases where public authorities use independent assessments, the general investing public uses corporate governance assessments -ensuring these assessments' "fair form and utilisation". The coverage of these assessments -and whether they would include unlisted as well as listed companies -remains a topic for further discussion.
What good would such assessments do? As we have argued above, having such assessments would help researchers and others look for correlations between corporate governance practices and administrative regulations such as those allowing for the use of offshore entities. Most importantly though, such assessments would help Hong Kong's and Mainland Chinese companies' improve their profitability and managerial self-dealing and fraud.
68 Some authors 65 See HKEx, HKEX 2015 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 24-28 (2016), https://www.hkexgroup.com/-/media/HKEX-Group-Site/ssd/Investor-Relations/Regulatory-Reports/doc uments/2016/e160321csr.pdf. 66 Influence represents a fascinating topic when dealing with quasi-independent agencies and entities. The US provides the most convincing proof that using administrative law (and related administrative disputes) provides the best way of deciding where the line between public and private should lie. In such law, the current standard consists of the requirement that independent bodies be fairly "formed and utilized." In other words, rules should ensure the independence of advisory/assessment group members (the "formed" part of the phrase) and public bodies use their advice (the "utilized" part of the phrase 71 Yet, few could doubt the usefulness of such assessments in reducing the kind of fraud and self-dealing exposed by the Panama Papers.
IV. DISCLOSURE-BIASED PRINCIPLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (AND THUS CORPORATE LAW?)
Why would more disclosure ensure these assessments' "fair form and utilisation"? In theory, the Listing Rules' requirement to publish enough information in corporate governance reports to allow for third-party assessment of corporate governance using the OECD Guidelines would encourage investors' and third party's feedback.
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The market for corporate governance information (investors, other stakeholders and regulators) would need to ensure "fair form" (that assessments come from independent, well-rounded, unbiased and probably diverse sources). 73 In theory, market incentives ensure One option consists of extending the doctrine of fiduciary trust developed over the decades in the public sector. Under such a doctrine, civil servants represent "public servants" -who should faithfully serve the public. 75 If civil servants have such a fiduciary duty in areas ranging from public service provision to regulation of the economy, then such a duty obviously also covers their handling of corporate governance regulations. 76 Siebecker argues that increased disclosure could result from expanding fiduciary obligations on corporate executives. 77 Such an obligation would bring corporate executives' duty of care or public trust closer to that expected of a civil servant. Yet, for such a principle to work, such a trust/duty must evolve in the public administration itself, to the point where private sector equivalents might be theorised. 78 Not everyone believes that such fiduciary duties to inform the public, for example, do or should extend to the private sector. sponsored enterprises represent a middle ground between public and private sectors, then clearly some middle ground must also exist visa-vis duties to corporate stakeholders (like the duty to disclose). 80 If politicians feel the pulse of society's views on rights and duties, then rights and duties in existing administrative law probably serve as the starting point for thinking about the way that corporate duties should evolve. 81 Clearly something prevents these norms from either working in Hong Kong's administrative law or translating into the private sector. Figure 5 shows Hong Kong's own scores for financial transparency (or lack thereof). 82 As is shown, Hong Kong ranks second worst among the jurisdictions polled for financial transparency. Hong Kong's unwillingness to sign up to several key international tax and anticorruption agreements represents one of the key reasons for Hong Kong's poor rating.
83 Hong Kong's large-scale overhaul of its money laundering rules probably makes part of this score too pessimistic. Yet, failing to sign up to key international transparency agreements represents a symptom rather than cause of secrecy. Behaviours typifying good corporate governance, like increased tax payments, become more prevalent as financial disclosures are enhanced.
84
Hong Kong's lack of a disclosure culture in its corporate governance attitudes underpins most of the reasons for Hong Kong's bad financial secrecy scores. 85 Enrique and co-authors' idea of letting 80 For an attempt to theorise this middle ground, turning the transparency fad into sellable services. 88 The UK has followed its consensual model -of having government coordinate the transparency effort. 89 Given the importance of business groupings in Hong Kong, a pan-sectoral body like the Hong Kong Trade Development Council can/should cheerlead corporate transparency. Such cheerleading may include educating businesses about the benefits of transparency and disclosure. Such work may also consist of making industry standards and norms encouraging transparency according to each sector's own particularities. Most important, the relevant body can help reverse the presumption in most corporations that information should be concealed unless explicitly authorised to be publicly disseminated. 90 Stakeholders in the corporate ecosystem should prefer transparency because better decisions come from fully disclosed information. 91 Authors like Dallas have noted that lack of transparency distorted corporate governance to such a degree as to contribute to the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] . 92 Against this background, corporate governance rules have increasingly moved away from requiring transparency for specific activities and toward a general "presumption of transparency" (that the company shall report 88 92 While most scholars agree about the lack of transparency in securitization, most still do not agree on the extent to which opacity contributed to the crisis. Dallas might argue that lack of information leads to short-termism, as constrained information makes guessing about consequences more difficult. and disclose as a default option unless such disclosures cause harm).
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Should a "reversed presumption of transparency/disclosure" consist of a right to information? If such a right has made wide inroads in the public administration, corporate interest groups and bodies like The Hong Kong Trade Development Council (or other suitable body) could endorse the right to information as a core value in companies' mission statements. 94 In the specific area of working conditions and information affecting consumers, many see business associations' encouraging their companies to follow international laws, which their own countries have not yet adopted, as a way forward. 95 To that end, these business associations directly advocate for increased transparency, or fund studies arguing for such transparency. 96 Even a submission to the EU Parliament recognises that the best way to influence such disclosure consists of using business associations to spread norms which are quickly developing in these countries' own administrative law. 97 Reversing the presumption of confidentiality means agents of a business would consider all the information they produce or receive as publicly disclosable, unless labelled confidential -except in cases like accounting firms or law firms, where the business has no rights over the information "lent" to it to do client work. 98 The needs for privacy differ between companies and individuals -with companies 93 Such a presumption fits in with the corporate governance-as-relationship view that the 2014 UK Code of Corporate Governance adopts. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (FRC), THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 2014, https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/59a5171d-4163-4fb2-9e9d-daefcd7153b5/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf. 94 For such a strategy, and a discussion of this right's progress in government, using such privacy for commercial advantage (or to protect the privacy of its agents). 99 Such norms may (and should) encourage company agents to disclose the information which does not help a company's competitive position, or information where the benefits of the public's right exceeds the costs to the company. 100 Just as administrative law has been evolving to deal with the benefits of the "collective processing" of increasingly complex information, so should the rules governing corporate disclosure. 101 If all companies agree to release information, no one company will find itself disadvantaged. 102 At the very least, such a presumption of transparency will help reduce the extent of insider trading and other ills which bedevil Hong Kong's exchanges. 103 Rulemaking by Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission (hereinafter referred to as "SFC") could promote such a change in administrative law toward stimulating a presumption-of-transparency culture. First, the SFC could adopt the spirit of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereinafter referred to as "IOSCO") principles, perhaps by issuing related broad guidelines. 104 While these principles deal with cross-border securities sales, they lay an important foundation for a general change in administrative jurisprudence, if adopted in Hong Kong's principles-based regulation. 105 One can read and adopt the standards mechanically, without thinking about the deep, underlying reasons for these standards. 106 Yet, even once financial institutions and listed companies adopt those principles, analysts like Lu would have reforms of both the International Disclosure Standards and the IOSCO itself, as well as the IOSCO's conduct of a "corporate governance impact assessment."
107 Second, the SFC can continue implementing the Financial Stability Board's and G20's recommendations on disclosure.
108 Hong Kong's authorities have noted numerous "planned steps" in their disclosure action plan. "Industry consultation" and "monitoring international developments" should focus on the final users of information, instead of just pushing disclosure for disclosure's sake.
Other rulemakings by the SFC could help change the direction of administrative jurisprudence (and thus the way business regulates itself). In line with its mandate to monitor firms' compliance with rules, including disclosure-related ones, the SFC could more actively assess and critique publicly-deficient disclosure practices.
109 Private markets and civil society have no incentive or resources to do such monitoring.
110 Public censure also matches the objective of encouraging more transparency/disclosure -something in the regulator's own interest. Indeed, the SFC's disclosure team could advice the users, as well as the producers, of disclosable information. At present, the team answers questions from Hong Kong listed companies about what information they need to give out publicly. Yet, the users of such information far exceed the producers of such articulation of what the Commission expects intermediaries to do is more appropriate than a large volume of detailed standards." See SFC, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INTERMEDIARIES 7 (June, 2011), https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/aboutsfc/Regulatoryframework.pdf. 106 For example, standard IV.A.1 relates to collecting the "name, business experience, functions and areas of experience in the company." Such information clearly aids investors and analysts quickly understand the company. As such, the company should place the information in a prominent place with these readers/users in mind. information.
111 Their small and scattered nature reduces the incentives of any one information user from militating for more disclosure. By offering a resource (such monitoring) to information users, the SFC could lower the costs of increasing disclosure/transparency. The SFC would also receive vital feedback from the market about where informational bottlenecks exist.
112
These rules validate Licht's decades old call to end the distinction between public and private law in regulating corporate governance and disclosure -they are two sides of the same coin.
V. USING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A LEVER FOR SELF-REGULATING BODIES
Nothing requires Hong Kong's professional services firms to move toward a risk-based approach toward choosing clients. Under such a system, these service providers would try to detect high-risk clients with poor corporate governance practices. Nothing in the Solicitor's Practice Ordinance requires solicitors to look at clients' risks (or any kind of risks affecting the practice). 114 Hong Kong should follow the US's "gatekeeper" approach to introducing riskbased assessment and risk management into the legal and other service professions.
115 The UK's Solicitors Regulatory Authority and the UK Law Society have best "mainstreamed" such a risk-based 111 Indeed, one of the main reasons for the existence of a regulator like the SFC stems from its ability to overcome collective action problems by requiring corporate disclosures which no one person or group has sufficient interest and/or resources to try and bargain for themselves. See approach into its legal services industry. 116 Moreover, the Authority issued new rules as part of its Handbook to move toward the wider adoption of principles-based, outcomes-based regulation. 117 Similarly, nothing in Hong Kong's Professional Accountants Ordinance encourages the Hong Kong Society of Accountants or the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants to adopt a riskbased approach as a means to accomplish one of its primary tasks as to "discourage dishonourable conduct and practices by certified public accountants."
118 Even in the Companies Ordinance, nothing requires boards to set up risk committees or manage risks like staff complicity in money laundering or other financial crime.
119 While the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries imposes risk-based guidelines on its members, the Institute makes no mention of internal rules about its own risk management practices (if any).
120
The easiest way to encourage a risk-based assessment of clients and their engagements (work) would be requiring Hong Kong's law firms, accounting firms and corporate services firms to set up risk committees and a risk register -as well as adopt a risk-based approach to compliance. 121 Specifically, lawmakers could eventually adjust Hong Kong's laws to reflect the obligation/right of professional services firms and company boards to adopt a riskmanagement perspective as way of dealing with compliance and risk -as well as scrutinize high-risk clients by extra monitoring. Institutions like the OECD have already taken on-board most academics' view that risk assessment represents the best way to 116 The Authority has produced a number of clearly written, easily found reference materials describing the use of such a risk-based approach. balance rules-based and principles-based corporate governance regulations.
122 Unlike at present, such an approach would cover more than just money laundering. 123 Such an approach would reduce the need for extensive and detailed regulations as well as costly compliance systems -thus saving listed firms and others money. 124 Such an approach would also probably encourage compliance with corporate governance and other regulations. 125 Yet, such an approach would need to start in administrative law -as civil servants and other administrators administer these requirements. 126 Yet, the way we analyse the Panama Papers and other scandals determines the way we think about designing the administrative law needed to tackle the problems these scandals highlight. Most analysts wrongly focus on legality of the structures and rules used by Mossack Fonseca and others to create and use offshore corporations -rather than the harms they cause. 127 They also wrongly focus on the narrow, specific harms of establishing offshore companies -in avoiding taxes for example. 128 The inability of lawmakers to change the domestic legislation that allows intermediaries to set up offshore entities results from the wrong conclusions used by critics of these rules. 129 As we already showed, the real harm resulting from the rules stemmed from the opacity which gave rise to no corporate governance of the offshore entities themselves and the poor corporate governance of companies associated with them. As the journalists who brought the Panama Papers to light noted, "the offshore system relies on a sprawling global industry of bankers, lawyers, accountants and these go-betweens who work together to protect their clients' secrets. These secrecy experts use anonymous companies, trusts and other paper entities to create complex structures that can be used to disguise the origins of dirty money." 130 Regulatory amendments should thus focus on the corporate governance consequences of intermediaries' setting up offshore structures -and not on ethics or rule-following. 131 Indeed, in the more flexible US legal environment, focusing on these consequences led to the creation of anti-avoidance doctrines -which review the intent behind the behaviour against circumvent rules for tax gain.
132
What role will intermediaries play in setting up and operating offshore companies when tax authorities around the world adopt "place of effective management" (or a similar test) when deciding on regulation and taxation? 133 The academic literature seems to show that, in the longer run, legal doctrines emerge -and lawmakers tend to ban these practices -exactly because of scandals like the Panama Papers imbroglio. 134 Yet, codifying new laws and regulations (by trying to break-up these kinds of doctrines into specific admonitions 129 Many administrative scholars have noted the extent of this problem -namely looking to add more procedures rather than looking at how rules address underlying mischief (problems to civil servants and others) adds to complexity -and thus confusion. Even as early as 2001, the US and others' experience has shown that principles-based regulation represents the best way to apply these doctrines.
135
How can the presumption of disclosure/transparency enter Hong Kong's administrative -and thus general -law? In line with the presumption of transparency, Hong Kong's professional bodies and associations (like the Law Society, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries) could encourage transparency -rather than confidentiality -as a corporate governance "default position."
136 Rules for the professions should encourage these professions to provide advice which enhances -rather than hinders -transparency. The Mossack Fonseca case threw the transparency of professional service firms themselves into the spotlight -as just another case of "gatekeeper failure."
137
Government regulators should not discourage professional services firms -through these associations or directly -from offering advice on tax or regulatory avoidance -as self-interest will always drive companies to hire advisors. 138 Instead, we note better governed firms -including professional services firms -engage in less avoidance, using loopholes and skirting the law. The legitimate economic purpose test represents one of the clearest, and most commonly known, principles by which administrative law defines the tax reporting obligations of firms.
143
While the test itself does not comprise administrative law, the way that civil servants interact with the test does. 144 The Hong Kong tax code requires tax assessors to consider "the form and substance of the transaction" (much like the Mainland rules) and the intent (whether for reasonable commercial purposes or simply to obtain a tax benefit).
145 While Hong Kong's tax code has not adopted the reasonable commercial purpose language, its "dominant purpose" test basically serves the same purpose. 146 As shown in Table 3 , Yang provides a fascinating account of the way the "reasonable commercial purposes" test evolved in Hong Kong and on the Mainland. 147 On the Mainland, the tax authorities over time expanded their application of the test. In contrast, the principle in Hong Kong bifurcated into seven sub-tests and Hong Kong's courts weakened the provision by ruling against the tax authorities on numerous occasions. Despite Hong Kong's hostility to applying a "reasonable commercial purposes test," the principle is not foreign to Hong Kong law and practice. The three sub-articles basically apply a legitimate economic purpose test by targeting "transactions designed to avoid liability for tax" (article 61a), "utilization of losses to avoid tax" (section 61b) and "avoidance arrangement of no effect" (section 61c). 149 Making such a legitimate economic purpose test more explicit in those articles would help ensure that businesses understand the logic behind the prohibitions contained in those articles. Civil servants would also adopt the habit of evaluating the ends of government action -rather than means. Similarly, any intermediary transaction with a company whose structure obviously lacks a legitimate economic purpose (like a manufacturer or service provider incorporated in the Bahamas) should clearly represent a higher commercial risk. 150 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange's listing rules could furthermore require a local incorporation or incorporation in the jurisdiction where the listed company makes and/or sells its goods and services. 151 The goal involves introducing the broader method of regulating by principles -rather than simply confining the use of such regulations to particular situations.
152
Hong Kong's comply-or-explain culture of corporate governance -basically a principles-based test -shows Hong Kong regulators' experience in imposing these kinds of regulations on companies. Such a culture requires firms to comply with the corporate governance rules, or explain why they have not complied with 149 Id. 150 Many experts have documented the risks of transacting with offshore entities -in the lack of recourse to certain laws (like bankruptcy law) and anonymity which stifles accountability. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, CHANCING IT: HOW SECRET COMPANY OWNERSHIP IS A RISK TO INVESTORS (2016), https://gfintegrity.org/report/chancing-it-how-secret-company-ownership-is-a-risk-to-investors/.
151 Even if the exchange and companies do not completely adhere to the rule, at least the jurisdictions of incorporation will show more variation than at present (as shown in Figure 59 ). them. 153 Unlike minimalist regulations, comply-or-explain regulations strive to provide the flexibility to react appropriately to market circumstances, while still following guidelines for good corporate governance -basically the same kind of goal as a legitimate economic purpose test (or any other test). 154 Following such an approach, businessmen actually help civil servants understand and apply regulation, in a way that minimally intrudes on the company. 155 In theory, comply or explain rules can support a legitimate economic purposes test. As we have shown, complex and opaque offshore structures harm shareholder value and allow poor corporate governance practices to abound. 156 If such offshore structures actually produce real and substantial benefits, these companies should explain them to the public -as required by Hong Kong's Code of Corporate Governance. 157 Indeed, such disclosures may well help academics and policymakers better understand the benefits of allowing such offshore incorporations. 158 One way to do this consists of introducing an explicit "legitimate economic purpose test" in article 61/61a into the Inland Revenue Ordinance (during the next major legal revision), in offshore listings, and in risk profiling clients/partners. Similarly, regulators at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Securities and Futures Commission could add a provision to the Hong Kong Code of Corporate Governance requiring companies to confirm that the jurisdiction they have incorporated in matches the firm's economic purpose, or explain why not. Both changes would encourage companies (and their regulators) to focus on final economic purposes -while offering flexibility in cases where other business needs dominate. 159 Other innovations in tax law might help inspire changes to the broader legal framework in the fight against corporate maladministration. Notably, Hong Kong's adoption of anti-abuse doctrines in its tax sphere might usefully serve to promote better corporate governance in the listing sphere. Hong Kong is a member of an OECD group working on regulations designed to stop treaty abuse that Mossack Fonseca's clients exploited so widely. 160 That forum uses the term Principal Purpose Test as a rough equivalent to the reasonable commercial purpose test we described previously. 161 Yet, at present, the Securities and Futures Commission's authorisation for companies incorporated abroad to list and transact in Hong Kong depends more on rule-following rather than the actual purpose and result of these rules. 162 As the SFC's Joint Policy Statement regarding the listing of overseas companies from September 2013 notes, the "Listing Rules require an overseas company to demonstrate that its jurisdiction of incorporation has shareholder protection standards at least equivalent to those of Hong Kong. If this is not possible, overseas companies can achieve equivalent standards by varying their constitutive documents to provide them." 163 For the BVI specifically, the HKEx Country Guide finds -in granting authorisation for BVI companies to list in Hong Kong, that "we do not consider BVI's shareholder protection standards to be materially different to our own." 164 As described in Figure 7 , the HKEx (and SFC for that matter) have broad discretion over the recognition of foreign corporate governance and other standards. They do not describe the extent to which risk assessment (rather than simple compare-and-contrast of law) plays a role in determining who can list. Would a simple principle or test make such a determination more predictable and transparent than no standard at all?
FIGURE 7 WHO EMPOWERS THE EXCHANGE TO What specific rules might encourage a focus on the overall economic purposes of corporate activity? The Panama Papers pointed to four practices in particular that undermine corporate governance in the wider business environment. 165 First, rules that allow or encourage mailbox company colonies (or large numbers of corporations based out of a mail centre or building in which none of these companies' economic activity occurs.) 166 Second, rules requiring foreign-only operation of companies (namely companies incorporated in a particular jurisdiction that are forbidden from operating in that jurisdiction). 167 If these jurisdictions consider the company unfit to operate within their borders, why would they consider them more fit to operate abroad? Third, domestic rules allowing for directors' meetings with individuals who have no knowledge of the companies they supposedly govern and shareholder meetings conducted as a formality without any important company policies or decisions being discussed. Fourth, rules allowing for the sale and subsequent operation shelf companies -as these shelf companies obviously had no legitimate economic purpose when incorporated. These rules have traditionally corresponded with companies having poor/little actual corporate governance -and provided ways for corruption and fraud to undermine corporate governance in larger, more established companies on the Mainland and elsewhere. 168 Yet, rather than simply banning transactions with these kinds of entities, a "non-administrative" administrative law would allow such transactions if they served a legitimate economic purpose.
Naturally, shell and shelf companies pose significant risks to corporate governance in Hong Kong and outside. If judged by media reports, the dire current situation begs for additional regulation. These reports claim that 40% of the 22 companies listed on HKEx (on the main board) for the three month period ending in February 2016 consisted of shell companies. 169 Share price volatility of these listed shell companies make the harms to equity markets and corporate governance in general obvious -with 56 companies' valuations increasing by more than 1,000% between 3013 and 2015, despite 39 of them losing money. 170 Few can document the corporate governance practices of many shell companies that have other shell companies as directors and shareholders. 171 Hong Kong's disclosure regime should thus include shell companies, special purpose vehicles and companies that work with them…something that anyone acting with an eye toward increasing transparency cannot avoid concluding.
172
Hong Kong's code of corporate governance should introduce a special section for offshore, shell/shelf, special purpose vehicles and conduit companies. Numerous studies have documented both the good and bad sides of using these kinds of structures. 173 Most authors argue that regulators should not try to "fix" these structuresbut rather increase their transparency. 174 Requiring that special purpose vehicles have a unique designation (like SPV rather than Ltd. or Inc.) can help ensure parties understand the nature of the entity they do business with. If these entities truly are companies, then why do they not issue the same large corporate governance reports as the traded entities that use them? Numerous studies have described how to modify accounting and reporting procedures for these entities.
175
Four amendments to the Code of Corporate Governance in particular could help reinforce the idea of focusing on final economic purposes. First, Hong Kong's policymakers could introduce rules in the Listing Rules companies from jurisdictions (or companies which transact with them) which require additional due diligence and a classification as a high risk entity if that company's jurisdiction allows or encourages: a) mailbox company colonies, b) foreign-only operation and c) directors and shareholder meetings with individuals having little knowledge of the companies they affiliate with, and d) sale and operation of shelf companies. Second, they could introduce a provision in the Code of Corporate Governance to require 172 Even common sense would lead businessmen to know more about their customers. For evidence about the wide-spread abuses of the current opaque system, see MICHAEL FINDLEY et al., GLOBAL SHELL GAMES: TESTING MONEY LAUNDERERS' AND TERRORIST FINANCIERS' ACCESS TO SHELL COMPANIES (2014) . 173 Ahlawat and co-authors in particular describe the pros and cons of these structures, along with their lack of transparency, particularly well. companies conducting any transactions with a shell company, offshore company from the BVI, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, or other jurisdictions decided by the HKEx to disclose such business and the nature of that business.
Third, they could require SPV at end of company name (like Limited) to designate that the entity is a special purpose vehicle. Fourth, they could require offshore, shell/shelf, special purpose vehicles, and "hollow" holding companies to issue corporate governance reports outlining their operations in the same way that normal companies do. These activities would increase transparency, rather than setting fixed proscriptive or restrictive rules.
Stepping back, the Panama Papers experience teaches us that the Exchange should regulate the practices of shareholder protection rather than simply standards. Clearly, the legitimate economic purpose test and anti-abuse provisions we discussed previously focus more on intent and action -rather than just written regulations and policies. The SFC and HKEx should focus more on practice in foreign jurisdictions and by foreign companies than on their printed policies. The easiest way to introduce such changes into the way we relate to (and regulate) companies' behaviour abroad consists of amending the Joint Statement, so that the second paragraph reads:
"Listing Rules require an overseas company to demonstrate that its jurisdiction of incorporation has shareholder protection standards and practices at least equivalent to those of Hong Kong. If this is not possible, overseas companies can achieve equivalent standards and practices by varying their constitutive documents as well as governance and enforcement practices to provide them". 176 
VII. CONCLUSION
The Panama Papers clearly show the need for Hong Kong's lawmakers and regulators to adopt rules encouraging better corporate governance. Judging by the past, Hong Kong's financial, corporate, tax and other regulations have failed to prevent the abuses identified in the Panama Papers. Yet, these failures tell us something more general about Hong Kong's administrative law -and its weaknesses. Effective regulations need to focus on ends, not means. alike. Principles-based rules focused on ends can also set a positive example -and a level of expectation -for self-regulating professions. No one could dispute that companies should pursue legitimate economic purposes. They should not unnecessarily avoid paying taxes. Corporations should also not withhold information simply because they can. If econometric evidence shows the benefits of good corporate governance, "non-administrative" administrative law (as we have defined it in this paper) represents the way that civil servants and regulators can encourage companies to follow such good governance. If other areas of the public administration work like corporate regulation, then perhaps it is time to rethink the way we write administrative rules.
